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On Their Own in Battered New Orleans
PETER G. GOSSELIN
Laurie Vignaud faces a double dilemma: If she rebuilds her wrecked
ranch house at 1249 Granada Drive in the great suburban expanse south
of Lake Pontchartrain, will her neighbors do the same? And even if they
do, will that guarantee their Gentilly neighborhood does not end up an
isolated pocket in a diminished, post-Katrina New Orleans?
Nothing in Vignaud's 46 years, not even her job as affordable housing
vice president with Hibernia Bank, the region's biggest financial institu-
tion, prepared her for this problem. From her relocated offices in Hous-
ton, she recently confessed, "It's scary." "I don't know when I'll ever go
home."
Double dilemmas abound in this deeply damaged city, and represent
considerably more than the start of the slog back from disaster.
Lost amid continued talk of billions in federal aid is the fact that most
homeowners and businesses are being left to make the toughest calls on
their own. Lost is that New Orleans' recovery-which President Bush once
suggested would be one of the largest public reconstruction efforts the
world had ever seen-is quickly becoming a private market affair.
"My constituents have pretty much concluded that it's up to us to put
our neighborhood back together and get on with our lives," said Republi-
can city council memberJay Batt, who represents the Lakeview neighbor-
hood just west ofVignaud's.
To market advocates, this is the way it should be. Rugged individuals set-
tled the American West in the nineteenth century and can resettle the
Crescent City in the twenty first.
But the risks that individual New Orleanians must shoulder in such an
on-your-own recovery appear staggeringly large.
"There is no market solution to New Orleans," said Thomas C.
Schelling of the University of Maryland, who won this year's Nobel Memo-
rial Prize in Economic Sciences for his analysis of the complicated bar-
gaining behavior that underpins everything from simple sales to nuclear
confrontations.
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"It essentially is a problem of coordinating expectations," Schelling said
of the task that Vignaud and her neighbors must grapple with. "If we all
expect each other to come back, we will. Ifwe don't, we won't.
"But achieving this coordination in the circumstances of New Orleans,"
he said, "seems impossible."
The situation in which residents find themselves is an extreme example
of a trend underway for a quarter-century, a shift of economic risk from
business and government to working families, and an increasing reliance
on free markets to manage society's problems.
Safety nets such as unemployment compensation, employer-provided
healthcare insurance and pensions, and, recently, effective disaster relief
have been reeled in or removed. Increasingly, families from the working
poor to the affluent are left largely to buy and sell their own way to safety
even when their individual efforts seem utterly outgunned, as they do in
the case of Katrina.
"There are classes of problems that free markets simply do not deal with
well," Schelling said. "If ever there was an example, the rebuilding of New
Orleans is it."
Promises, Then Reality
Prospects for a quick municipal comeback peaked 17 days after the hur-
ricane and flood, when Bush stood before St. Louis Cathedral in historic
Jackson Square and told a national television audience that "there is no
way to imagine America without New Orleans, and this great city will rise
again."
The hopes thus raised were kept alive in the first two months following
Katrina. The president sought first one, then two emergency spending
bills totaling $62 billion. The Army Corps of Engineers quickly signed con-
tracts to rebuild the city's protective levees to their pre-storm condition.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency announced it would award
60,000 households the maximum allowable relief of $26,200. A steady
stream of planning conferences by architects, urbanists and political lead-
ers spread the good word that major metropolises never die.
But in recent weeks, a new reality has settled in as the agencies that were
stepping up to help guide the city's comeback have stepped back down
again.
FEMA said it would stop covering the hotel costs of more than 50,000
households at the beginning of December-later extended untilJan. 7-
even while acknowledging that many, especially in New Orleans, would
have trouble finding alternative accommodations.
Despite repeated pleas, the Corps and the White House refused to
promise any strengthening of the levees beyond what was underway. Inves-
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tigators, meanwhile, concluded that several of the protective walls that
failed did not meet corps-approved standards, a discovery that raised
doubts about the safety of the entire levee system.
Emergency spending slowed sharply. The national flood insurance pro-
gram temporarily suspended claims payments for Katrina, and program
officials hinted broadly that they would tighten eligibility requirements to
get coverage for the next storm.
Even the tiny agency charged with gauging the elevation of America's
ground added an unexpected hurdle. It quietly announced that New
Orleans and environs had sunk more than anticipated, forcing it to
replace all of its measuring sticks. The result is that New Orleanians will
have to build higher to escape future floods. With so many new strikes
against it, the city's recovery, already grindingly slow, has ground still
slower. Three months after the storm, Entergy New Orleans, the bankrupt
utility that serves the city, said that 55,000 of its 190,000 customers had
resumed electrical service. Municipal officials estimate that less than one-
third of the population has returned to live.
To an extent almost inconceivable a few months ago, the only real
actors in the rebuilding drama at the moment are the city's homeowners
and business owners. To be sure, Washington is offering many relief pay-
ments, tax breaks and FEMA trailers. The city is speeding the approval of
building permits. But for the rest, individual New Orleanians are strug-
gling to come back largely under their own power, using mostly their own
resources and negotiating their return substantially on their own terms.
While that might seem perfectly reasonable to outsiders, local and state
leaders say that it overlooks the crucial fact that most ofwhat people need
to make such a one-at-a-time, free-market recovery work was demolished
or severely damaged by Katrina, including about two-thirds of the city's
145,000 homes.
"What's missed is that it wasn't a single house or business that was
destroyed, but an entire region," said Rep. Richard H. Baker (R-La.),
chairman of a House financial markets subcommittee and author of one
of the few comprehensive rebuilding proposals.
"It does no good to stand up just one person or family, because there's
nothing left where they once lived-no schools or grocery stores, doctors
or banks, police stations or firetrucks," Baker said.
"We've got to go into the business of restoring whole communities."
A Family's Challenge
Among the communities are ones that Laurie Vignaud helped finance
and others that her father, 74-year-old Leroy Vignaud, helped build.
The younger Vignaud grew up a few miles from Granada Drive, the only
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daughter among four children of a plastering contractor and his wife.
Laurie Vignaud and her brothers have lived most of their lives no more
than a 10-minute drive from their parents.
In the mid-1960s, Leroy Vignaud began snapping up buildings to
repair, then rent or sell, and has now gone through 20. By the mid-1970s,
he was landing top-dollar jobs like restoring the ornamental plaster inside
St. Louis Cathedral.
With the money he made, Vignaud was able to move his family into a
big house with a circular staircase in a then largely white section of town.
"I busted some ground there," he said proudly of his economic and racial
climb. His daughter had a debutante party when she turned 18.
But the elder Vignaud kept largely to his own. It was left to his daugh-
ter's generation to learn to move effortlessly across the racial divide. By
now, they have; black, professional and rising, they are widely seen as the
future of New Orleans, the people-perhaps more than any other-who
must return after Katrina for the city to rebound.
Mter a marriage to an Air Force officer that produced two daughters-
Ashley, now 20, and Lindsey, l6-and ended in divorce, Laurie went to
work for black-owned Liberty Bank. By the late 1990s, she had moved over
to historically white Hibernia and was responsible for helping the bank
comply with federal requirements that it reach out to poor and segregated
communities.
Her job gave her the wherewithal to drive a Lexus ES 300 sedan, keep
a second car for the girls and hire an interior decorator to help renovate
the house on Granada Drive.
Her first project for the bank was an l8-house development called Del-
ery Square in the poor, mostly black Lower 9th Ward. She put together a
program to help ensure that New Orleans police officers and firefighters
could buy in the city. She put together another to help cash-poor jazz
musicians afford homes. She crisscrossed Louisiana and Texas, promoting
affordable housing and doing deals.
Until Katrina.
Besides wrecking Laurie's Granada Drive home, the storm damaged or
destroyed virtually everyone of her projects in New Orleans. In the case
of Delery Square, the houses are still standing, although flooded. Almost
every structure around them had been crushed or washed away.
Katrina also drowned the five properties that Leroy Vignaud had kept
for retirement income-at least three of them irretrievably. He and his
wife have spent most of the time since the storm sharing a three-room
apartment in a Houston senior center with Laurie and her daughters. He
is reluctant to go out in an unfamiliar city because he is legally blind and
has diabetes. So he sleeps mostly, watches a little TV and, his daughter
fears, broods about his losses.
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To get some sense of the problems that confront property owners, start
at 1249 Granada Drive.
Inside Laurie's house, floodwater flipped the black upholstered sofa
with the white highlight, snapped her roll-top desk and deposited the
washing machine on top of the dryer. Moisture got up under the glass of
a hallway poster, making it almost impossible to read "Turning Point. The
Harlem Renaissance." Humidity caused the wooden blades of her ceiling
fans to wilt like dead leaves.
The only thing orderly is the mold, which covers every surface. Each
spore sends out spoke-like tentacles called hyphae that bloom at regular
intervals into furry "fruiting bodies." The result where a single colony has
won dominance on a wall or overhead is a startling black bull's-eye.
"Conditions are optimal for the fungi," said University of Colorado
mycologist Mervi Hjelmroos-Koski, in New Orleans recently to take sam-
ples. "They are just doing their job" of digesting whatever they land on.
Back outside, look in any direction. Every structure for miles and miles
is in essentially the same shape.
City Was Ailing
New Orleans looks substantially less resilient than other American cities
that have come back from disaster. Chicago at the time of the Great Fire
of 1871 and San Francisco after the 1906 earthquake were boomtowns.
New York after 9/11 was largely intact. By contrast, much of New Orleans'
economy had been stagnating for a generation before Katrina. What had
not been stagnating either contributed little to overall growth or was dam-
aged by the storm and flood.
The ports of New Orleans and nearby South Louisiana, the largest in
the nation, were largely spared by Katrina. State and local officials pass up
no opportunity to describe them as gateways to the Mississippi River basin
and linchpins of the American economy.
But asked about inferences that the city is equally important, Gary P.
LaGrange, president of the Port of New Orleans, said, "That's bull."
Most of the steel, rubber, plywood, grain and frozen poultry handled by
the ports flow straight through without stopping to be processed or pur-
chased. "New Orleans is the biggest through-put port in the country," said
LaGrange. "It doesn't need the city. The value added here is very mini-
mal."
By contrast, the city's hospitals and universities, which provided New
Orleans with 17% of its private sector employment, lie in ruins with little
chance of quick recovery.
Tulane University is expected to slash its graduate programs, which now
number 44, when its board of trustees meets. Among the most painful
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decisions will be putting off for at least the rest of the academic year, and
perhaps substantially longer, returning its medical school from Houston,
where most of it is now temporarily housed.
Louisiana State University, which manages the city's two biggest hospi-
tals, Charity and University, has furloughed all but 275 of its nearly 4,000
New Orleans employees, and will shortly have to permanently lay them
off.
"I'm going to run out of cash by Christmas," said Donald R. Smithburg,
chief executive of the LSU hospital system. 'Without some fast financial
help, I don't know how I'll ever get the pieces put back together again."
With such top-down elements of its economy as these damaged or iso-
lated, New Orleans appears almost entirely dependent on a bottom-up
process of one individual's decision to rebuild piling atop another's until
recovery becomes self-sustaining.
In theory, such a virtuous cycle is at the heart of every market economy,
and, once underway, should revive the city. But a look at some of the
uncertainties facing individual New Orleanians-rich and poor, black and
white-suggests that this is where matters turn truly daunting.
Levees Hold the Key
According to Schelling, the key to making almost any kind of human activ-
ity work is "credible commitments." Buyers must make them to sellers.
Governments must make them to citizens. Nations must make them to
each other.
The credible commitment that virtually every resident of New Orleans
wants more than any other is a pledge from the Army Corps of Engineers
to rebuild the levee system bigger and better than before Katrina.
"If they put back good levees to the [Category 3] level authorized
before Katrina and we can get a commitment to build them slowly up to
Category 5, people will come back," said Walter Isaacson, a News Orleans
native, former editor ofTime magazine, former chairman ofCNN and co-
chairman of the Louisiana Recovery Authority, a new state board
appointed by Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco to oversee reconstruction.
"It won't be a purely rational decision, but they'll come."
But the corps has made it clear that it has no intention of making any
such grand commitment soon.
In part, the problem is cost; estimates ofwhat it would cost to bring the
city's levees up to Category 5 range from $4 billion to more than $30 bil-
lion. In addition, the corps' budget is perhaps the most closely controlled
of any in the federal government, with Congress ear-marking almost every
dollar to particular projects, leaving the corps little maneuvering room.
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But there also appears to be a sense among senior corps officials that local
demands for greater protection, if indulged, would be unceasing.
"It's of interest to me," New Orleans district commander Col. Richard
P. Wagenaar told the Los Angeles Times several weeks ago, "that all the polit-
icalleaders, all the business leaders and all the homeowners were all per-
fectly comfortable with the system on Aug. 28," the day before Katrina
made landfall. "They knew full well it was being built to Category 3, and
everybody was fine with that," he said.
But when a storm of greater strength struck and overwhelmed the lev-
ees, Wagenaar said, people "suddenly wanted to look back and say, 'Hey,
what happened?'" The implication: When would calls for still more ever
end?
In the weeks since Wagenaar made his comments, state investigators dis-
covered that sheet pilings along floodwalls that failed on 17th Street and
London Avenue near Granada Drive extended to barely half the depth
that Corps designs called for, and that the walls themselves were of a
weaker design than what the corps had recommended. On Wednesday,
corps engineers partially confirmed the findings.
The news has opened a new front in New Orleanians' fight for outside
help in rebuilding. In effect, they argue that while what happened to
much of the city was a natural disaster, what happened to many of the sub-
urbs south of Lake Pontchartrain was the result of a failure of the corps
and therefore something for which Washington should compensate them.
"We're talking about the negligence of man, not an act of God," said
Republican state Rep. Emile "Peppi" Bruneau, who represents the area.
"Our citizens are showing the spirit to survive, but it is unfair to ask peo-
ple to pump their already damaged savings back into their homes and
businesses without a demonstrated commitment from the federal govern-
ment to protect us the right way this time," New Orleans Mayor C. Ray
Nagin said.
The problem for residents is that years will pass before all of the inves-
tigations are complete and the decisions made. In the meantime, the dis-
covery of flaws along the two canals has caused fear to spike about the
safety of the entire levee system and produced the opposite of the "credi-
ble commitment" New Orleanians need.
''You have to wonder whether the same flaws exist in places that didn't
breach," said King Logan, a marketing executive whose home in the tony
Country Club Gardens neighborhood took on 6 feet of water, despite
being considered on high enough ground to be safe from flooding.
"I'm certainly not going to rebuild," he said, "until somebody convinces
me the rest of the system isn't as poorly built."
Such transparent lack of confidence represents a huge strike against
chances for the kind of free-market recovery on which city now depends.
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Flood Insurance Woes
If city residents aren't getting what they need from the Army Corps of
Engineers, they are having even less luck with the government's national
flood insurance program.
In theory, the FEMA-run program should make decisions about
whether to rebuild easier because it assumes some of the financial risk
involved by promising to cover up to $250,000 in flood damages.
And because FEMA requires that the buildings it insures be built above
the projected level for a once-in-100-years flood, the program seems to
provide protection against the actual physical risk of flooding as well.
But flood insurance has turned into a morass in the wake of Katrina,
with many homeowners and business owners finding it nearly impossible
to collect for the just-passed storm or to figure out what coverage they'll
be eligible to get for the next one. The disarray represents a second strike
against hopes for a go-it-alone rebuilding.
Part of the problem is that while Washington provides basic flood insur-
ance, the government depends on private insurance agents to sell it as
part of a standard homeowners' policy. Interviews, lawsuits and com-
plaints filed with the Louisiana insurance commissioner's office suggest
that many agents are underselling the flood portion of policies while over-
selling the company-provided homeowners' part.
Some homeowners, like Louis J. GentryJr., who together with his wife,
Kim, just finished rebuilding their Lakeview home two years ago and
insured it through State Farm, have discovered themselves financially
"upside down" without enough flood coverage to payoff their mortgage.
Others, like Vignaud, who insured through Travelers, said that they were
assured the homeowners' portion of their policies would cover their
house's contents even in case of flood, only to learn otherwise since Kat-
rIna.
Spokesmen for State Farm and Travelers refused to comment.
But problems with past coverage are nothing compared with the con-
fusion over future coverage. Homeowners are worried-apparently with
good reason-that the rules are about to be changed so that many will
have to literally raise their houses in order to qualifY for flood insurance.
For tens of thousands like Vignaud, whose post-World War II suburban
homes were built on concrete slabs rather than above the ground on
piers, that's a near impossibility.
New Orleans now requires owners to comply with a 1984 map that
divvies the city into dozens of districts, each with a different base flood ele-
vation that's dependent notjust on where a structure is relative to sea level
but also on how good local drainage and the city's pumping system are in
that area.
Michael K Buckley, deputy director of the national flood insurance pro-
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gram, said in an interview that FEMA was about to announce that it
thought the city would need to raise those flood elevations 1 to 3 feet.
Buckley cautioned that the increase was only advisory; Washington is at
least a year away from requiring the city to adopt higher elevations. City
officials have promised that anyone who rebuilds in the meantime will be
grandfathered under current rules. But sooner or later, many New Orlea-
nians are going to have to raise the elevations of their buildings, or go
without flood insurance.
In a final perverse twist, a separate federal agency that certifies the
measuring points that are used to gauge buildings' elevations recently
withdrew hundreds of its benchmarks for the New Orleans area, saying
that they had sunk as the ground had subsided and were no longer accu-
rate.
The National Geodetic Survey replaced the old benchmarks with nine
new ones. State and local officials said the new benchmarks effectively
raised by as much as a foot the zero mark, or starting point, for measuring
whether a building meets the elevation required to qualifY for flood insur-
ance.
"People have got to realize New Orleans is sinking," said Roy K Dokka,
a geologist and director of LSD's federally funded Center for Geolnfor-
matics. "It can be made safe if the proper steps are taken, but it's a vul-
nerable place to live."
Chalk up a third strike against free-market reconstruction
Who Will Come Back?
Even after learning to live with their fear about the levees and solving their
flood insurance problems after wrapping their minds around the idea
that their homes may have to be raised and the land under them is sink-
ing, New Orleanians still have another hurdle to cross.
That's the double dilemma of whether if one person rebuilds, will his
neighbors, and, even if they all do, will that be enough to ensure their
neighborhood's survival?
As a work crew gutted 1249 Granada Drive on Monday, heaping appli-
ances, sofas and sheetrock in a 6-foot pile on the curb, Laurie Vignaud
suddenly realized her only evidence that any of her neighbors had
returned since Katrina was similar heaps outside their houses.
But do those piles mean that Granada Drive residents are ready to
rebuild, or simply are picking through the wreckage and trying to buy
time by stopping the mold's spread?
"I keep looking at all this stuff and wondering whether they're coming
back or not," said Vignaud. "It's crazy, like a riddle I can't solve."
In fact, a few neighborhoods appear to have solved the riddle, or at least
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to have taken a good run at it. But the ways in which they have says much
about the daunting dimensions of the problem facing the rest of the city.
On the northern edge of the city is New Orleans' Greek Orthodox com-
munity and its church, Holy Trinity Cathedral. As warnings about Katrina
grew darker in the days before the storm, community leaders matched up
families to whisk the elderly and infirm out of danger. In the days imme-
diatelyafter, they mobilized to come back again.
"We ran it like a business," said John D. Georges, the parish council
president and chief executive of Imperial Trading Co., a regional supplier
of convenience stores.
Father Anthony Stratis worked the phones and sent out e-mails to find
parishioners. Parish council member Dr. Nick Moustoukas followed up by
wiring money to the neediest. Ten days after the storm, Georges and coun-
cil member Christ Kanellakis helicoptered in to rescue the church's chal-
ice and tabernacle.
By acting in concert, members of the Greek community have in effect
provided each other with an immense self-insurance policy, guaranteeing
that if one family rebuilds, others will. And, should more enticement be
needed, the church, according to Georges, Moustoukas and others, is pro-
viding returning families with thousands of dollars of cash aid, has organ-
ized bulk purchases of new appliances and has arranged for crews that
repaired the cathedral to be introduced to people whose houses are in
need of work.
By the time the cathedral reopens for its first full service in two weeks,
its marble interior walls will have been repaired, its lawn will have been
resodded and Holy Trinity will be back in business.
Without ethnic and religious ties like the Greek community's to bind
them, other neighborhoods are turning to what's been described as the
great new binder of people: the Internet. Dozens of neighborhood web-
sites have popped up since the storm. Quietly, almost by accident, the city
is emerging as a test of the Internet's power to let people organize them-
selves.
When 28-year-old Cherie Melancon Franz and her husband, Arthur, 32,
used the website Rebuild Lakeview (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/
rebuild_lakeview/ ) to organize a "back to the breach" gathering at a levee
break along the 17th Street canal in early October, they expected 50 peo-
ple. Instead, they got 500. When the couple, who lost their home at 5837
Milne Blvd., subsequently arranged a $6,500-a-house group rate for dem-
olition, they got 15 takers in a matter of hours.
Others, realizing that they face the double dilemma of not knowing
what their neighbors will do or whether their neighborhood will reach the
critical mass needed to survive, have tried to use the website to solve the
problem.
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"One of the difficult parts of going to Lakeview," one resident said in a
message posted last week, "is that it is impossible to know who is staying and
who is leaving ... I suggest that all those that are staying, hang a Mardi Gras
flag on their houses to show their neighbors that they are coming back.
"Wouldn't it feel good to ... see these flags popping up all over the
place? Do it!"
Still, "Rebuild Lakeview" and similar sites have left many residents with
the same aching questions about when will it be safe to return and what
their neighbors will do.
"I read it every few days, and there's some good information," said Lou
Gentry, whose house at 6622 Louisville St. is about 10 blocks from the
Franzes'. "But until they tell me something definite about the levees and
the insurance and who's coming back, I'm keeping my money in the
bank."
Little Choice But to Leave
When Laurie Vignaud was in town last week, she registered the car she
purchased to replace her drowned Lexus, and renewed her Louisiana dri-
ver's license-two inexpensive ways to maintain her connection with New
Orleans.
But when the work crew gutting 1249 Granada Drive hauled the last
load from the house, she told them to board it up after it dried. Then she
and her daughters headed for Houston and a newly rented three-bed-
room town house in a gated suburb.
"It would just break my heart if I lose that house," she said. But with so
much up in the air about the levees, insurance, her neighbors and the city,
she said, "there's no way I can do anything now."
Vignaud's employer, Hibernia, was acquired recently by Virginia-based
credit card giant Capital One Financial Corp. and is aggressively expand-
ing in Texas. The bank's Houston-based executives have asked her to stay,
according to Hibernia Executive Vice President Willie Spears. Next week,
she expects to be in Brownsville to hire a new employee, then fly on to Dal-
las for more hiring.
Meanwhile, Leroy Vignaud is trying to get FEMA to put a trailer next to
his house with the circular staircase. He has purchased a small pickup
truck and a few tools.
Legally blind and on unfamiliar terrain, he has asked his wife to drive
him home to retrieve what he can.
"I can't walk away from my resources," he said.
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Note
Reprinted from the Los Angeles Times (December 4,2005).
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